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
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THE PHYSIOCRATIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

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St. Louis University

IN the forty years before the French Revolution, those years of intellectual ferment known as "The Enlightenment," social and political reform became the chief concern of thinking men. Whereas thinkers of the seventeenth century had been concerned mainly with mathematics and physics, those of the mid-eighteenth century wanted primarily to create a better social and political milieu for themselves and posterity. Reform thinkers of the Enlightenment were aware that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries war had been the normal thing, that one war had followed another as the great powers tried to maintain the delicate balance on which peace then depended.¹ They also saw how war had grown consistently more destructive as it spread out over larger areas to include not only all

*Relatively little on the Physiocrats has been written in English. Until a decade ago the only volume describing physiocracy as a system of thought was Henry Higgs, *The Physiocrats* (London, 1897). Max Beer's *An Inquiry Into Physiocracy* (London, 1939) is the first attempt in English to interpret the Physiocrats as something other than Adam Smith's predecessors. There are no other volumes in English devoted to a systematic coverage of the physiocratic system. John Arthur Mowat's *The Physiocratic Conception of Natural Law* (Chicago, 1943) and Mario Einaudi's *The Physiocratic Doctrine of Judicial Control* (Cambridge, 1943) are scholarly analyses of a particular aspect of physiocratic theory. The only article in English on physiocratic political thought is this author's "The Physiocratic Defense of Legal Despotism," *Saint Louis University Studies*, Series B, Vol. I (1945), pp. 21-47. Arthur J. Bloomfield, "The Foreign Trade Doctrines of the Physiocrats," *American Economic Review*, XXVIII (1938), pp. 716-735, necessarily touches on their ideas of international relations.

Nothing in French deals specifically with the subject of this essay, but the following works touch on it in one way or another: Leon Cheinisse, *Les idées politiques des physiocrates* (Paris, 1914); André Lorion, *Les théories politiques des premiers physiocrates* (Paris, 1918); Paul Dubreuil, *Le despotisme légal, vues politiques des physiocrates* (Paris, 1908); and H. Holldack, "Der Physiokratismus und die absolute Monarchie," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXLV (1932), pp. 517-549.

¹G. N. Clark counts only seven years in the seventeenth century when there was no war. Cf. G. N. Clark, *The Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1931), especially chapters VI and VII on "Armies" and "Navies."

The early eighteenth century was not much better. Two major wars were in progress when it opened: the War of Spanish Succession, terminated by the

of Europe but also colonial outposts in India, Africa, America and throughout the Atlantic. Moreover, war had put a more severe strain on the state's budget as armies became larger and the engines of war more complicated and costly.²

Reformers of the Enlightenment therefore looked upon the question of international relations as one of the pressing problems they must solve in order to usher in their more perfect society of the near future. Prominent among the reform thinkers of this period were the Physiocrats, a group of social philosophers centering around François Quesnay, physician to Madame de Pompadour. Although the Physiocrats have not attracted as much attention among historians for their theory of international relations as have some of their contemporaries, such as the Abbé Saint-Pierre, or Rousseau, or Kant, nevertheless they were influential in their own day.³ They were close to such "Benevolent Despots" as Catherine II of Russia, Joseph II of the Empire, Leopold of Tuscany, and Gustavus III of Sweden. They had their own journal, *Éphémérides du citoyen*, and they engaged in controversy with such important figures of the day as Voltaire and Rousseau, Mably and Condillac, Diderot and Grimm. They were a closely knit group of men who exerted much influence and attracted much attention both because of their theories and because of the strategically impor-

Treaty of Utrecht in 1713; and the Great Northern War, ended by the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721. A series of short wars followed Utrecht in Western Europe when Spain tried to readjust things in favor of Elizabeth Farnese's sons. Then came the War of Polish Succession in the 1730's, and finally the War of Austrian Succession from 1740 until 1748.

²Clark sums up his excellent study on armies thus: "The numbers engaged in single battle were greater; the total numbers under arms in Europe were greater; the proportion of the available men of military age who became soldiers was probably greater." *Ibid.*, p. 100.

³The Physiocrats fell into oblivion because of a combination of circumstances over which they had no control. The appearance of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 cut short their influence in economic thought. The failure of Turgot's reform ministry (1774-1776) discredited their specific reform proposals, for Turgot had been closely associated with the Physiocrats and he tried to put many of their proposals into practice, but most of all, the French Revolution cast physiocracy into the limbo of forgotten theory, for the Physiocrats had advocated the benevolent despotism against which the French Revolution was directed. They had fulminated against Rousseau's democratic ideas and against Montesquieu's theory of checks and balances; they looked instead to the enlightened ruler to effect all necessary reform in the state. For a full discussion of this point cf. Thomas P. Neill, "The Physiocratic Defense of Legal Despotism," *Saint Louis University Studies*, Series B, Vol. I. (December, 1945), pp. 21-47.

tant positions which they held.⁴

I

For two principal reasons the Physiocrats have more than mere historical importance for those interested in the subject of international relations. In the first place, they wrote in an age which has some points of similarity with ours. In the eighteenth century mercantilistic theory underlay not only each state's domestic economic regulations but also its general policy in international relations. The question of war or peace, the choice of leagues and alliances, decisions on commercial and colonial policy were all determined by a combination of dynastic connections and the maxims of the mercantilists. It is in this background and against these theories that the Physiocrats directed both their reform proposals in economics and their political theories.

In the second place, physiocratic theory possesses more than mere historical importance because it is essentially moral. The Physiocrats thought they derived their conclusions from the nature of the universe and from man's own nature, that their theories therefore held for all times and all places.⁵ If there is any truth in their body of doctrine, which is essentially normative, then it should not be entirely alien to men of the twentieth century. It deserves at least careful examination to see whether any of their "changeless" doctrines are practical today, and whether any of the arguments they advanced against the mercantilists and in favor of their system of international relations possesses the cogency for us of the twentieth

⁴Besides Quesnay, the most important Physiocrats were Marquis de Mirabeau, Le Mercier de la Rivière, the Abbé Baudeau, Le Trosne, and Dupont. Mirabeau, father of the more famous Comte de Mirabeau, came from an important naturalized French family. He had been a soldier, and later an experimental farmer. Mirabeau was the impetuous "bad boy" of the group who occasionally brought disfavor on the Physiocrats by his rash statements. Le Mercier had been a lawyer with the Parlement of Paris and later Intendant at Martinique. Le Trosne was a prominent lawyer from Orleans, Baudeau was a theology professor who had become an editor and a leading light of the "Enlightenment," Dupont was a bright young boy who served as copy-reader and hack-writer for the group. His writings are a faithful reflection of what the older men discussed with greater maturity.

⁵This was commonly held in rationalist circles. "What is true in Paris is true in Pekin" was a frequently repeated axiom in the eighteenth century. Le Mercier puts the rationalist belief on this point thus: "Since truth exists by itself and is the same in all places and at all times, we can arrive at it, and at all the practical consequences which result from it, by reasoning and examination alone."—Le Mercier de la Rivière, *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques* (London, 1767), I, 194-195.

century that they possessed for the "enlightened" minds of the eighteenth.

Although the Physiocrats have gone down in history as the first modern economists, they by no means confined themselves to considerations which can today be covered by the term "economics." They were rather social philosophers whose field of inquiry included all the social sciences: ethics, politics, sociology, and economics.⁶ Their theory was essentially normative, for they were interested in things as they should be. From their first principle that man is a social being whose rights and duties can be deduced from his nature, they built their "natural order" where things were as they should be. The physiocratic natural order served as a norm whereby existing governments could be criticized. It was the ideal toward which all governmental policies should tend.

In the physiocratic natural order man possessed certain rights, the most important of which were property, security, and liberty, which derived from his right to the full development and free use of his natural faculties. The state's sole function in the physiocratic system was to guarantee man in the possession of his natural rights.⁷ Its domestic policy and its foreign relations should therefore be guided by the basic consideration that it was not to interfere with the citizen's rightful activity, be it cultural, economic, or social. The ideal state to the Physiocrats was pretty much the policeman-state.⁸ Its role was confined chiefly to protecting the citizens from each other (domestic policy) and from foreigners (foreign policy).

⁶Quesnay's own writings are mostly articles and collections of laconic observations, both on such philosophical subjects as "Natural Law," "The Immortality of the Soul," and "Free Will," and on such economic subjects as "Farmers," "Grains," and "Commerce." He wrote practically nothing on foreign affairs. But he felt the necessity of including the subject in an ensemble of physiocratic teaching. At his request Mirabeau undertook such a synthesis of physiocratic doctrine in his *Philosophie rurale* of 1766. Mirabeau's work was a failure, and it remained for Le Mercier to give the classic presentation of the full body of physiocracy in his *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques* in 1767.

⁷Quesnay's *Despotisme de la Chine* contains his basic political ideas. His longest piece of writing, it appeared originally in the *Ephémérides du citoyen* and later in the collection of basic physiocratic writings prepared by Dupont in 1768 and entitled *Physiocratie*. It has been translated into English and appears as the second volume of Lewis A. Maverick's *China, A Model for Europe* (San Antonio, 1946). Le Mercier's *L'Ordre naturel* is considered the best summary of physiocratic political theory. Another good summary, which devotes almost as many pages to international relations, is Le Trosne's *De l'ordre social*.

⁸This was the normal thing for reform theory of the mid-eighteenth century.

The physiocratic ideal order can be best understood by remembering that its advocates sought to apply Newtonian concepts to social life. Each individual should follow his enlightened self-interest as the planets follow the law of gravity, they held, and the result would be an harmoniously ordered society in which all individuals play their respective parts perfectly--and unthinkingly--by taking care of their own interests. The Physiocrats maintained that this harmony was best promoted in economic life by unlimited freedom of competition. Hence their attack on mercantilistic restrictions on free trade and their advocacy of a laissez-faire policy by the state.⁹

The Physiocrats believed that their truly important contribution to social thought was the discovery of a material, personal sanction attached to the observance of the moral law. Dupont wrote, in an introduction to one of Quesnay's articles, that older writers had developed the concept of a just order quite well but that they had never found "a physical sanction to the natural law. M. Quesnay has begun by showing its imperious physical sanction, and this has led him to a full knowledge of justice."¹⁰ Frequently in his writings Le Trosne labors to show there is perfect identity between justice and self-interest, "a principle of the greatest fecundity, which decides all questions of political economy, which dissipates all prejudice, which suffers no exception and no modification, which presents to the ad-

Diderot and the Encyclopedists, Adam Smith and most other reformers wanted to reduce the state's role to a minimum. This tendency was a natural reaction to the mercantilistic system of Colbert and his followers, whereby the state supervised everything in its own interests.

It is well not to overemphasize this point with the Physiocrats, however, because they were willing to assign the state a large number of positive tasks whenever they promoted the interests of the individual farmers or businessmen.

⁹The Physiocrats have been linked too intimately by historians with laissez-faire philosophy. It is much more Gournay, Intendant of Commerce in France, who deserves credit for developing and popularizing the laissez-faire philosophy on commerce and industry. The Physiocrats had an abiding distrust of businessmen; they advocated full freedom of commerce mainly as a protection for the buyer.

¹⁰"Notice abrégée des différents écrits modernes qui ont concouru en France à former la science de l'économie politique," originally published in eight numbers of the *Éphémérides du citoyen* in 1769, and republished in Auguste Oncken, *Oeuvres économiques et philosophiques de F. Quesnay* (Paris, 1888), p. 152.

Dupont reiterates this point as late as 1815 in a letter to J.-B. Say, when he tells the latter that Quesnay's principal objective was to show the utility of conforming to natural law.

ministration a fixed and invariable point of departure."¹¹ In their discussion of political arrangements and of international relations, the Physiocrats continue to stress this point that their system is not only just and "natural," but also of material benefit to the nations concerned.

Government in the physiocratic system is entrusted to an hereditary monarch. The Physiocrats used typically rationalist arguments to refute the cases which had been presented in favor of an elective monarchy, of an aristocracy, and of a democracy. The hereditary monarch would have centered in his person both legislative and executive power. He would be restrained only by natural law, which was to limit him in both his legislative and his executive capacities, and by an enlightened public opinion that he dare not flout. The Physiocrats believed that their single, tax arrangement, whereby the sovereign received his entire revenue from a tax on the net product of agriculture, would put him in the position of being able to further his own interests only by promoting the material welfare of his country. So it was to be to his selfish interest to rule well and wisely.

II

Like so many other political theorists before and after them, the Physiocrats looked upon the state as "the individual writ large" and the community of nations as a family of individuals.¹² "Nations should be regarded," Le Trosne wrote, "as individuals who maintain themselves in universal society by the same laws as citizens do in a particular state."¹³ Le Mercier uses the human analogy more consistently than do the other Physiocrats in order to advance his argument in favor of "brotherly" concerted action by the states. From his analogy he draws conclusions on interstate relations which are not logically warranted. He insists, for example, that the term "*fraternité*" be used in describing international relations inasmuch as the states are all "brothers." Again, without proving the point, he makes the assertion that "nature has established among nations the same duties

¹¹*De l'intérêt social*. The edition used by the author was published in 1777 as the second half of Le Trosne's more important *De l'ordre social* (Paris, Chez les Frères Debure), p. 713.

¹²The Physiocrats use the terms "state" and "nation" interchangeably. Occasionally these two terms seem to possess different meanings, but they are both used quite loosely to refer to the land and people under the jurisdiction of a particular sovereign.

¹³*De l'ordre social*, pp. 354-355.

and the same rights that it has between men."¹⁴ Although the other Physiocrats also use the human comparison frequently, they do allow themselves to be seduced into drawing conclusions from it, as Le Mercier does.

The Physiocrats admitted that states differed from men in possessing sovereignty. But they circumscribed state sovereignty tightly with their claim that states are as much subject to natural law as are human beings--and it is natural law which governs all relationships in the physiocratic system.¹⁵ Properly speaking, they held, no government can make law. "Legislative power," according to Quesnay, "often disputed over by sovereign and nation, belongs primarily to neither; its origin is in the supreme will of the Creator."¹⁶

Neither men nor their governments make the laws, nor can they make them. They recognize them as conforming to the supreme reason which governs the universe; they declare them; they carry them over into the milieu of society. . . . That is why one calls a carrier of the law "*législateur*," and the body of the laws carried over "*législation*," and no one ever has dared to say "*fais seur de loi, légisfacteur, ni légisfaction*."¹⁷

Therefore, as in the domestic field positive law is an explicit deduction from natural law, so in the international field all relations between nations are deducible from the same natural law that holds sway over all society.

On the basis of their theory that states are under natural law and that they are related to each other as are the citizens of a nation, the Physiocrats built their attack on the mercantilistic assumptions which guided the foreign relations of eighteenth-century states.¹⁸ Mercan-

¹⁴*L'Ordre naturel* (Paris, Guenther, 1909), p. 250. This is the edition used by the author for all the following quotations from Le Mercier.

¹⁵At a time when the ruler was truly the state, it was much easier to assert the same morality for state action as for human action. For governmental measures were those of a single human being, the ruler.

¹⁶"Despotisme de la Chine," in Oncken, *op. cit.*, p. 642.

¹⁷Dupont, "Maximes du Docteur Quesnay," in Eugène Daire (ed.), *Physiocrates* (Paris, 1846), p. 390. Daire's collection of physiocratic writings is still the most complete in any language.

¹⁸There is no formal body of thought which can be labelled "mercantilism." There are, however, a number of theories and practices on which almost all so-called mercantilists agreed. They are principally: 1) the government should control economic activity in the interest of the state; 2) the economic interests of states are mutually antagonistic; 3) hard money is an

tilists worked on the assumption that states were necessarily in bitter competition with each other, that the prosperity of one state could be increased only at the expense of others. They assumed that even if states could avoid fighting declared wars against each other, they must always engage in economic and commercial competition which aimed as much at a rival nation's ruin as at one's own nation's prosperity.

Against the mercantilists the Physiocrats insisted that commerce is never a real cause for war, since commerce thrives in time of peace and suffers in time of war. Moreover, foreign trade for the Physiocrats was a rather unimportant item in a nation's industry, an adjunct to domestic commerce which should be kept to a minimum and should be conducted on exactly the same lines as domestic trade.¹⁹ Physiocratic theory condemned war for commercial gain as both immoral and impractical: immoral because it was a violation of the property rights of other nations; impractical because commerce was a service rather than a true source of wealth, and consequently there was no reason for trying to increase one's share of it. They further held that national boundaries were arbitrary creations which could not rightfully alter the nature of commerce, which they had defined as "the exchange of value for equal value."²⁰ The nation's true interest lay in agriculture, for this alone produced wealth. Industry and commerce only changed its form and its location. International tariffs were therefore not to a nation's interest. Moreover, they were "unnatural" in that they were harmful in stopping up the free flow of commerce between individuals who happened to reside within different states. Because they believed that complete freedom of international trade was part of the natural order and because they held that there could be no such thing as a "favorable balance of trade,"²¹ the Physiocrats concluded that

especially valuable form of wealth and should therefore be accumulated; 4) exports should exceed imports; 5) only raw materials should be imported; 6) foreign commerce should be carried in one's nation's own ships; 7) agriculture and industry should be encouraged with the end of economic self-sufficiency in view. The classic work in English on the subject is Eli F. Heckscher, *Mercantilism* (2 Vols.)

¹⁹The Physiocrats were always suspicious of the commercial class, and they were never interested in promoting its interests. See particularly Quesnay's "Du Commerce" in Oncken, *op. cit.*; Le Trosne's chapter on "le commerce extérieure" in his *De l'intérêt social*; and Le Mercier's four chapters (36-39) on domestic and foreign commerce in his *L'Ordre naturel*.

²⁰Le Mercier, *op. cit.*, p. 254. Cf. also Quesnay, "Du Commerce," in Oncken, p. 449; Le Trosne, *De l'intérêt social*, p. 521.

²¹The Physiocrats insisted that money was only a medium of exchange, and that a nation can buy only as much as it sells and sell as much as it

war for commercial reasons was absurd and meaningless. Rather than being a cause of war, the Physiocrats held, commerce should be one of the strongest ties cementing nations together in friendly interdependence, "the best means of bringing about this happy state of perpetual peace."²²

III

Physiocratic theory on war was likewise directed against the common mercantilistic assumptions of the eighteenth century. Although the Physiocrats were not pacifists, nevertheless they looked upon armed struggle between nations as the last result of a stupid and greedy policy pursued by the European nations of their time. To them war was both a moral and a practical problem. They approach their discussion of the problem by making the typically rationalistic clear-cut distinction between offensive and defensive war. The former they condemned for both moral and utilitarian reasons. "It is thus not only by the laws of justice that it is necessary to judge an offensive war, but also by calculation and by the consideration of [your nation's] interest."²³ Offensive war is always unjust because it is a transgression of the property rights, the security, and the personal liberty of the citizens of another nation. More than that--and this point the Physiocrats stressed--it does not pay a nation to wage offensive war. In the first place, it is expensive to conduct and difficult to bring to a successful conclusion. Finally, because the European nations adhered to the balance-of-power policy in international groupings, the neutral states are bound to combine in order to prevent any one nation from gaining a sizeable increase of territory or wealth or power.²⁴

Defensive war was quite another matter, both practically and morally. It is easier and less expensive to wage, the Physiocrats pointed out, and it is more likely to be brought to a successful conclusion. More important in the case of defensive war, however, was the moral consideration. The Physiocrats held that the sovereign was not only justified in fighting a defensive war, but that he had the duty of waging such war if it were a necessary means of protecting his subjects

buys. Le Mercier voices the common opinion of the Physiocrats when he accuses the mercantilists of "confusing the common interest of the nation with the particular interest of its commercial people." *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

²²Le Trosne, *De l'ordre social*, p. 417.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 384.

²⁴The Physiocrats reached this conclusion, of course, from reviewing the bitter experiences of Louis XIV. Each of the French king's "successful" offensive wars against Spain, Holland, and the League of Augsburg was stopped after initial successes because the combination of European powers directed against France's further aggrandizement.

against foreign invasion. "A nation which attacks another with open force puts the latter in a state of legitimate and indispensable defense. It is God himself who authorizes the right of war; he has made it a duty for the sovereign to whom he has entrusted the sword for protecting and maintaining the society he governs."²⁵

The Physiocrats follow the general European tradition of late medieval and early modern times in justifying war as the last resort to be taken by a ruler when all other means of defense have failed. But they add their own curious utilitarian note to the argument by trying to show how justice and practical judgment are always on the same side.

The employment of this force [defensive war] becomes legitimate when it is made necessary by the social welfare, always inseparable from justice. But war is so formidable an evil that it should be the last resort, and all other, pacific means of negotiation should be exhausted before entering on a course whose consequences are so harmful and the events of which are so uncertain. As soon as war becomes indispensable, as soon as force is the sole means of repelling violence and usurpation, then it is justice itself which arms the ruler, not for a passionate and ill-tempered vengeance, but for the protection of society, for its liberty, its existence, and the defense of its members. Then war is in the order of things, and it becomes a duty. Inaction becomes a crime in the eyes of God and a scandalous cowardliness before men. Then the soldiers who fight for the state become ministers of justice and defenders of the common welfare.²⁶

One point the Physiocrats repeatedly drove home against the mercantilists was the fact that "hidden" commercial war is as destructive and harmful as declared war between nations. This "hidden" war they condemned was the commercial and economic competition between nations which the mercantilists considered a natural and necessary thing. The Physiocrats insisted that this "underhand, hidden war"²⁷ was as reprehensible morally and as disastrous practically as open, declared war between nations.

²⁵"De l'utilité des discussions économiques," *Physiocratie* (Paris, 1768), Vol. IV, p. 32. I have not been able to ascertain who wrote this article. It certainly was not Quesnay. It seems to have been one of the "rationalist group," most likely Baudeau.

²⁶Le Trosne, *De l'ordre social*, pp. 377-378.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 414.

Less destructive in appearance [Baudeau wrote] the underhand and perverted hostilities of an ignorant foreign policy are not less harmful to humanity than the violence of open war. . . The result of these hidden hostilities is basically the same as that of invasions with armed forces: depopulation of the country, and devastation of our common mother, the land, which is the source of our life and our welfare.²⁸

Commercial rivalry, with its prohibitive tariffs, its navigation acts and its other discriminatory measures, was therefore bad both in itself and because it frequently led to declared war between nations. In fact, Le Trosne claims, "our wars today are most frequently commercial wars."²⁹

Finally, in their attack on mercantilistic assumptions, the Physiocrats condemned the balance-of-power system which governed the foreign policy of most European nations in the eighteenth century and was defended as natural by the mercantilists. The Physiocrats looked upon it as contrary to the natural order of things, which should see the various nations of the world cooperating to promote the common welfare of humanity. The balance-of-power system, they held, was the artificial, unnatural creation of politicians, a system based upon essentially false assumptions. They centered their attack on the balance-of-power system on this point: its purpose is supposedly to maintain permanent peace, but by its very nature it works against anything more than a short-lived cessation of hostilities. It makes for temporary truces while the powers arrange alliances for a fresh encounter. Therefore it is a means which fails to attain its purpose.

Any permanent alliance, they maintained, must be based upon a continuous community of interests. But the groupings effected by the balance-of-power system establish no common interest among the allies except that of restricting the aggrandizement of another power or group of powers in Europe.

This equilibrium of Europe [according to Le Trosne] properly presents only a bad assortment of contrary and discordant interests which are not reconciled and placed under a common aim, which can only be that of harmonious cooperation, but are balanced over against each other and opposed to each other by building them on forces and counterforces, combined by treaties as variable as the very interests which they try to sustain.³⁰

²⁸*Première introduction à la philosophie économique*, in Daire, *op. cit.*, pp. 813-814.

²⁹*De l'ordre social*, p. 417.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 394.

As soon as the rival group of nations ceases to present a formidable front, the original purpose of an alliance has been lost. It must therefore find another potential enemy, or fall apart.

The Physiocrats condemned the balance-of-power system for dividing nations that should work together, for arranging them in two camps to check each other instead of uniting them all in the same common effort of conquering the world's resources and increasing their common wealth and consequently the welfare of their citizens. Even worse than this negative result of preventing effective action toward the nations' common goal, the balance-of-power system actually promotes the wars it is theoretically supposed to prevent. "Certainly," wrote Le Mercier, "it is poorly suited to prevent wars among the powers of Europe; it seems rather to serve as the occasion or the pretext for them; because war is always made to maintain the balance of power; peoples thus set about slaughtering one another, armed against each other by a system they imagine will prevent this slaughter."³¹

IV

The Physiocrats held that nations are properly parts of a larger community: human society. Philosophically speaking, this larger community possesses the same rights that the whole possesses over the part in any organism or any organization. Moreover, history gives it superior rights over the individual nation, for the general human society existed before particular states had come into being, and it surrendered none of its prerogatives to them upon their creation. It is, in Le Mercier's words, "a natural, general, tacit society, which has necessarily existed previously to the establishment of particular societies, and which has not been destroyed by their institution."³² Individual states were created in order to consolidate more firmly and guarantee more effectively the individual rights of the human beings who make up the general society. Therefore, the Physiocrats conclude, individual states draw their rights and duties from this primitive society. They can claim no rights not found in it and based upon it.

Le Mercier illustrates and reinforces the physiocratic argument that individual states are only sub-divisions of the general primitive society by using the analogy of a tree.

³¹*L'Ordre naturel*, 244. Curiously, the Physiocrats do not appeal to history to prove their point, as they could so easily have done. Perhaps they assumed that their readers all knew the record of international struggles of the last two centuries. More likely, however, they disdained the appeal to history when a more cogent rationalist argument was at hand.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 242.

Particular societies are truly but different branches of a single trunk from which they draw their substance; they are only different classes of the natural, general, tacit society which precedes their institution. . . . Each nation is thus only a province of the great realm of nature; therefore they are all governed by the same laws, by laws which should be perfectly similar in all essential matters, if all these nations have attained a knowledge of absolute justice and injustice, a knowledge of the unchangeable order by which the Author of nature has decreed that all men should be governed in all places and at all times, and to which he has attached their best possible state [of existence].³³

The European nations therefore hold their welfare in common. Because of their common interests and because of their intimately bound lines of interdependence--like the branches of a tree--they are destined to prosper together or to languish and decline together. No nation's prosperity is autonomous; it is based upon the well-being of the general society of which it is a part. The Physiocrats stressed this positive reason for concerted action among the nations because they were convinced that states would work together consistently and effectively only when they had a common positive end in view. "A true union," Le Trosne wrote, "can be solidly established only on a clearly recognized common interest, and it can be maintained only by a common interest toward which all force and all wills are directed."³⁴ The Abbé Saint-Pierre's project for perpetual peace is dismissed lightly by the Physiocrats because he failed to give it the sufficient motivation of a positive aim and because he failed to show how "it is clearly useful to maintain it [peace], and how the states can only lose in disturbing it."³⁵

From this argument that nations are only sub-divisions of a common society it follows that foreigners are not to be looked upon suspiciously as enemies. They are fellow citizens of the general European society whom accidents of history have placed within different sub-divisions of the whole. So neither individuals who live in foreign countries nor the foreign nations themselves are to be considered more inimical than one's own neighbors. Here, of course, the Physiocrats direct their statements against the commonly accepted mercantilistic assumptions of the day, for though the eighteenth century was

³³*Ibid.*, p. 243

³⁴*De l'ordre social*, p. 392.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 417.

cosmopolitan in its outlook, nevertheless foreigners were considered subjects of rival--and therefore inimical--nations.

This word [foreigner] has long since become a signal of combat among men. A fatal, but almost universal, prejudice has confounded the idea of foreigner with that of enemy, not only in speculation but also in practice. Nations are looked upon as necessarily committed to war against each other: this unhappy prejudice has been sanctified, it has been made a virtue under the name of "patriotism."³⁶

Against this "fatal prejudice" the Physiocrats asserted their rationalistic argument that national barriers are purely artificial creations which in no way make formerly associated human beings each other's enemies. The Physiocrats had proved, at least to their own satisfaction, that men in society have mutual rather than conflicting interests, that any apparent conflict of rights was a disturbance of the "natural order." This perfect harmony of interests, they maintained, applied to individuals who lived in different states as perfectly as to neighbors in the same city. The argument was purely rationalistic, and the Physiocrats could not understand how Rousseau's sentimentalist appeal to patriotism excited to action those very Frenchmen who agreed intellectually with the physiocratic argument but did not allow it to influence their non-speculative activity.

V

The Physiocrats therefore came to the conclusion that nations should not be organized on the balance-of-power principle, nor should they remain completely isolated, but that their efforts should somehow be concerted. Just as individual men benefit from mutual help and from pooling their abilities to attain common objectives, so too should the nations of Europe find some means of working together harmoniously. Such concerted action is advocated by the two regular physiocratic lines of argument: first, it is "natural" and therefore morally the correct policy; second, it is eminently practical and therefore of immediate benefit to all nations and all individuals concerned.

Concerted action by the powers of Europe, and even more than that, an actual confederation of these powers "is the natural state of Europe," according to Le Mercier, because "all the peoples of our continent, divided in fact and by mistake, rightfully form a single

³⁶Baudeau, *Première introduction à la philosophie économique*, in Daire, *op. cit.*, p. 808.

society."³⁷ The general interest of this society, Le Mercier continues, "is nothing other than the product of the diverse particular interests of its members,"³⁸ and for that reason the European confederation, when once it includes all the nations of Europe, can have no other interest than the positive one of promoting the welfare of its members and the negative one of protecting each member state from international injustice.

Both Le Mercier and Le Trosne, who present the two most fully developed physiocratic arguments for European confederation, turn quickly from the abstract moral argument to the utilitarian one of showing the practical benefits which will accrue from concerted action by the European powers.

The principle of the fraternity of nations is not only dictated by justice: it is equally conformable to the interest of each nation, independently of the conduct of the others. It should not simply be regarded as a beautiful moral idea, good for being taught in the schools of philosophy, but also as a practical maxim of government which cannot be broken without harm [to the nations concerned]."³⁹

Baudeau uses the same line of argument when he writes that "the principle of the fraternity of nations. . . invariably conforms to the interest of nations in general and to that of each of them in particular. If such is its nature, how can it be regarded as a beautiful speculative idea impossible of realization?"⁴⁰ He therefore concludes his argument for a "fraternity of nations" by asserting that it is "evidently as much on wisdom as on justice that there is established a proper and beneficial policy, which establishes between nations relations of peace, of unity of interest, of fraternity, of liberty and immunity of commerce, of inviolable respect for property rights and liberty."⁴¹

³⁷*L'Ordre naturel*, p. 248.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 250. The Physiocrats, strangely enough, never advert to the possibility that the interests of one member state could be promoted by the confederation at the expense of other state's interests. A possible explanation of this omission is the fact that the Physiocrats sought only to present the picture of how society could work out in the ideal "natural order," where there is such a perfect harmony of interests that true gain for one individual cannot be accomplished at another's expense.

³⁹Le Trosne, *De l'ordre social*, pp. 413-414.

⁴⁰"De l'utilité des discussions économiques," *Physiocratie*, Vol. IV, p. 30.

⁴¹*Première introduction à la philosophie économique*, in Daire, *op. cit.*, p. 818.

So the Physiocrats asked for some sort of union of European nations. It should be relatively easy to achieve, they argued, when once human prejudices had been broken by an enlightened, dispassionate study of their arguments.⁴² Le Trosne believed that European nations had so much in common that some kind of unity on the higher political level was not only "natural" but practically inevitable. Not only does he cite "conformity of religion, of customs, of government,"⁴³ but also many items which he had previously said divided European nations, "treaties, alliances, and commerce"--all of which "seem to multiply in concert toward forming this great union, binding it tighter, cementing together all its parts, and communicating to it an irresistible force."⁴⁴ Le Trosne seems to have believed that Gustavus III was more likely than anyone else to put the physiocratic system into effect, that he would accomplish it soon, and that the revolution in Sweden would be the germ which would spread to all of Europe. Under his aegis, and with the cooperation of such other enlightened rulers as the Margrave of Baden and Leopold of Tuscany, Le Trosne thought that the ideal international order would be ushered into Europe.⁴⁵

Although they believed such a concert of nations easy to achieve, the Physiocrats nowhere present specific plans for its organization or its operation. Le Trosne and Baudeau frequently use the terms "fraternity" and "confederation," but they do not go on to define what those terms mean. Le Trosne speaks of a fraternity of "sovereign states" in his discussion of the problem, a term which seems to indicate that he did not contemplate having the benevolent despots surrender any portion of their sovereignty. However, it should be remembered that in the physiocratic order the ruler did not possess the full, unlimited sovereignty he later acquired in John Austin's

⁴²The Physiocrats believed this of their whole body of thought. They believed, as good rationalists, that truth had an irresistible force when it was properly presented to the mind of man. All they needed to do, then, was explain their system and they would win mankind's approval. Moreover, they were firmly convinced that when once a single nation had adopted their system, its example of unparalleled prosperity and felicity would force all nations to adopt it.

⁴³*De l'ordre social*, p. 360.

⁴⁴*Ibid.* As a matter of fact, the governments of Europe in the eighteenth century were all quite similar, modelled, as they were, on the government of Louis XIV of the previous century.

⁴⁵Le Trosne thought that the American colonies, in revolt against England at the time he was writing, showed some disposition to realize the physiocratic natural order. He does not go into any details, however, on the grounds for his judgment.

theory of sovereignty, or even in Bodin's previously enunciated theory.

Baudeau seems to picture a purely voluntary union of the various European rulers who will agree among themselves to be guided by physiocratic principles. These are few and simple for international affairs. "Not to usurp any property, nor violate any liberty is the law of the nations, that is to say, it is the sole restraint which should be imposed on the employment of their property and their liberty."⁴⁶ Baudeau does not prescribe whether this agreement is to be made verbally or whether it is to be put into solemn treaty obligations. He does not indicate whether it is to be backed by any sanctions, or whether its being observed is to depend entirely upon the good will of the enlightened despots of his time. The implication seems to be that the rulers will be sufficiently enlightened to understand the physiocratic arguments in favor of their concerted action and their confederation not to violate the terms of their agreement.

Le Mercier uses the term "confederation" more consistently than do the other Physiocrats. Although he does not sketch out any plan for its organization or devise any specific means for its functioning, he does touch on the problem of sanctions to be applied against recalcitrant members. Each nation, he says, has imposed on it "the duty of concurring in and maintaining the rights of other nations; but by this duty it obtains the right of securing for itself in turn the forces of the other nations for the defense of its own proper rights."⁴⁷ His summary of the principles of international relations and the way they are to be observed in the physiocratic system does not show much advance over the stand of the other Physiocrats.

Not to allow oneself any undertaking against another nation, to join together and use force in order to hold others to the same obligation, there is the essential order of your general society, the same as that of particular societies; it is all contained fully in these two maxims: their simplicity, and even more the evidence of their justice and their necessity tells you that this order is made in order to bring nearer and nearer, in all parts of the world, the peace and welfare of humanity."⁴⁸

⁴⁶*Première introduction à la philosophie économique*, in *Daire*, op. cit., p. 818.

⁴⁷*L'Ordre naturel*, p. 251.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 251-252.

VI

In certain respects physiocratic thinking on international relations was "dated" by the age in which its authors lived. When the Physiocrats wrote of the state they had in mind a dynastic state controlled by an absolute king. When they wrote of a nation they had in mind the pre-Rousseauvian concept of the nation as a passive collection of citizens who made up the population of the dynastic state. International relations for them therefore consisted of relations between the benevolent despots who could address each other as "*mon cher frère*"--a play on words, incidentally, which Le Mercier adverts to in his argument for a "fraternity" of nations instead of a balance-of-power system created through sets of alliances.⁴⁹

International relations for the Physiocrats, then, consisted in personal relationships established between the various absolute kings, relationships maintained by occasional "brotherly conferences," by notes from sovereign to sovereign,⁵⁰ or by the rulers' personal envoys. The Physiocrats were forced to place full faith in the wisdom and the good intentions of Europe's various rulers. They did so willingly, it can be supposed, because the benevolent despots of the time all played with reform theory, and most of them flattered the Physiocrats by asking for their counsel and pretending to follow it. Physiocrats were called in as advisers from Sweden to Naples, from Russia to the Iberian peninsula. Nowhere in European courts, indeed, except in England and to some extent in their own France, were the Physiocrats ignored. It can be understood, then, how they naively trusted the rulers of the day to be sufficiently "enlightened" to see the cogency of their arguments on international relations and well-intentioned enough to put them into effect.

These rulers of the Age of Enlightenment, with all their defects, were as close an approximation to Plato's philosopher-king as have sat on European thrones at any time in history. They handled international relations themselves, as a rule, and they were relatively independent of all public opinion save that of French *philosophes* like Voltaire, the Encyclopedists, and the Physiocrats. For that reason

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁵⁰In this cosmopolitan age rulers frequently visited each other and showed great interest in each other's reform projects. They prided themselves, too, on their note-writing ability—which might give effect to anything from witty jingles about mistresses to proposals for alliances or for the partitioning of such a country as Poland. The sovereigns of this age, generally speaking, handled their own foreign affairs.

there was no need to think of the structure that an European confederation would take, nor of a definition of functions, nor of delimiting the confederation's sphere of action from that of the individual state's. The important task of the time was to convince enlightened public opinion and the rulers that the assumptions of mercantilists and the working-out of the balance-of-power system were untenable in an enlightened society. This is what the Physiocrats tried to do. Much of the cogency of their argument was lost when the French Revolution not only wrecked the dynastic arrangement upon which they relied but also replaced their rationalistic approach to political and social problems with the romantic nationalism and liberalism which have dominated political action since 1792.

Some of the physiocratic arguments, however, possess value that is independent of their immediate setting. Their attack on mercantilistic assumptions, for example, continued to possess validity, for mercantilism has influenced state policy through most of modern history. Although the physiocratic theory that commercial war is unnecessary and in the long run unprofitable was postulated of a society that did not know the Industrial Revolution and its resultant problem of distribution, nevertheless it is a theory which still deserves serious examination today.

Most important among physiocratic contributions to thinking on the subjects of international collaboration and an European confederation was the now rather obvious utilitarian motivation they gave to such concerted action. As has already been indicated, they considered this their great contribution, and because they thought all persons, rulers as well as subjects, were moved by calculated self-interest they thought they had unlocked the secret that would end all war and all international rivalries. Although they committed the usual mistake of the time in oversimplifying human motivation, still they did add an argument for international collaboration which was to appeal to men from their day to ours. The Physiocrats accepted all the traditional Christian arguments in favor of a modern *respublica Christiana*, and they added to them the pragmatic note that it was also good business for everyone concerned.

There is one other new argument suggested by the Physiocrats but not fully developed by them--nor, indeed, by anyone else of note for more than a century more. Whereas they considered the main purpose of an European confederation the negative one of preventing war or any other form of international injustice, they also suggested that nations could better promote their common welfare by positive united action than they could singly. But it would be a mistake to

believe the Physiocrats looked toward anything like a UNESCO or ILO. They looked more toward the abolition of international tariffs, toward cooperation in dredging international waterways, toward concerted action which would clear the road for private initiative to increase the prosperity of Europe.

The Physiocrats looked upon the state as "the individual writ large," and their ideal individual was a busy man who worked so hard that he did not have time to meddle in another's business. International relations in the ideal physiocratic order, then, would be largely an absence of relations. In Quesnay's ideal state of China, where the dominant passion of self-interest keeps the people forever busy, foreign commerce is insignificant in amount and international relations are a minor item on the Emperor's agenda of business. So it should be for all states in the physiocratic system. International relations are always to be friendly; collaboration rather than rivalry is the keynote governing them. Only infrequently, however, will occasions for cooperation occur. The rest of the time the various nations will keep busily employed minding their own business and promoting their own prosperity.

LA CROIX'S FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS*

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ONE of the great journalistic accomplishments of modern times is *La Croix* and the chain of newspapers it has established throughout France since 1883. The founder of *La Croix*, an Assumptionist, Father Vincent de Paul Bailly, must surely be ranked with Joseph Pulitzer, William Randolph Hearst, and the Harmsworths as one of the great organizers and promoters of early popular journalism. Fifteen years after its first appearance, *La Croix* was described by a Catholic priest who opposed its views as "the most widely-used Catholic newspaper and that read by most Catholic priests." Although neither *La Croix* nor any of the newspapers or journals which it has organized anywhere in France has drawn the attention of observers of French politics except in crises, it is still without a doubt one of the most potent influences upon the entire French Catholic scene, and therefore upon France.

Father Bailly, who had been Napoleon III's confidential telegrapher, entered his novitiate as an Assumptionist in 1860 when he was thirty years old. After serving as a chaplain, first in the Papal army, and then in the army of France, in 1877 he was named editor of a little religious monthly, *Le Pèlerin*. Within two years, this remarkably able journalist had raised the circulation of this journal from only a few hundred to 80,000. In January, 1880, he decided to establish a companion journal, *La Croix Revue*, specifically to oppose Freemasonry, which most French Catholics believed to be responsible for the anti-clerical campaign then being waged so successfully against the position of the Catholic Church in the French educational system. The success of this journal was great, due largely to Father Bailly's provocative style and to the fact that it appealed openly to the Catholic masses, which were generally neglected by both the Catholic newspapers and journals.

While he was in Bethlehem in March, 1883, on one of the twenty-eight pilgrimages he was to make to the Holy Land during his lifetime, Father Bailly decided to transform *La Croix Revue* into a daily

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newspaper selling for only five centimes. Almost from its first appearance on June 16, 1883, this newspaper was a tremendous success. Within a year, its circulation reached 30,000 daily. It was short, well-edited, simple and well-illustrated. It was disdained by Catholic intellectuals but was very popular with priests and with devout lay Catholics, upon whom it grew to have enormous influence. By 1889, it was a very securely established newspaper with a circulation of 60,000.

During the decade after 1888, the *Maison de la Bonne Presse* and the various *Croix* publications reached national significance in France. The editors used the very latest equipment throughout the printing plant, and the *Maison de la Bonne Presse* was noted for its pension plan, cooperative restaurant, and sickness and accident insurance. In 1888, the editors lowered the price to one centime, sent representatives touring through France on circulation drives, and persuaded country priests not only to subscribe but to become salesmen. Working most intensively during the winter and during retreats and missions, *La Croix* developed to a very high degree many of the techniques familiar in newspaper promotion much later. Free copies were distributed for a month or two in areas where circulation drives were scheduled. New subscribers at first received the paper for a week free; later this period was increased to a month. *Comités de la Bonne Presse* were founded in more than 10,000 parishes, and childrens' clubs, the *Chevaliers de la Croix*, were formed to sell subscriptions from door to door. After 1888, annual congresses of the most able junior salesmen and saleswomen were held, and these helped to spread throughout the system the most effective techniques.

As a consequence of this capable promotion, *La Croix* became an organ of tremendous influence among the sincere Catholic masses of France. The daily circulation arose to 110,000 in 1889, 140,000 in 1890, and 180,000 in 1893. Although the daily circulation of *La Croix* in 1894 was only a fraction of that of the *Petit Journal* or of that of the *Petit Parisien*, the Paris version of the newspapers designed for the masses, it was more than double that of *Figaro* and of *Le Rappel*, "the most widely-read Radical Republican daily."

The *Maison de la Bonne Presse* not only developed a tremendous circulation for the daily *Croix*, but it also spawned a popular Sunday edition and numerous provincial editions. *La Croix du dimanche* was founded in 1885 and in 1890 had a circulation of 200,000, which rose to 365,000 in 1894 and 525,000 in 1899. The first two weekly provincial supplements were published in Reims and Limoges in 1889, but in 1890 there were eighteen, in 1891 thirty, in 1892 forty-four, in 1893 seventy-one, and in 1894 one hundred and four provincial sup-

plements. During 1894, more than 2,000,000 copies of various *Croix* publications were being printed each week.¹

The principal political issue for French Catholics at this time was the question of the attitude which should be adopted towards the Third Republic. The Catholic Church in France had profited and grown under the Second Republic and the Second Empire. In 1850, under the Second Republic, the Falloux Law was passed, allowing Catholic schools again to operate freely in France and thus tolerating a great increase in the number of Catholic schools of all kinds. Napoleon III, who ruled France as Emperor from 1851 until 1870, not only allowed Catholic influence in French education to grow but also eliminated many anti-clericals from the state school system. After 1858, his aid to the Italian state in its drive for the unification of Italy alienated most French Catholics, who were bitterly critical of the Emperor for aiding the enemies of the Pope. When Napoleon III fell in 1870, the Kingdom of Italy seized the city of Rome and Pius IX proclaimed himself "the prisoner in the Vatican."

Disaster soon befell the French Catholics at home too, for gradually from 1875 through 1878 the French Republicans obtained control of the government of the Third Republic. Anxious to cripple their enemies and to secure their position, they immediately struck at the Church's grip on education and the minds of the future. With its conservative political allies impotent then, the Catholic Church saw its congregations and teaching orders in France dissolved and disbanded and witnessed the proclamation of free, compulsory, and *lay* primary school education for France.

The successful anti-clerical campaign against the Church in France from 1879 through 1884 was a grievous blow and a great shock to most French Catholics. Unable or unwilling to accept their defeat as a consequence of their own politics, they searched for an easy,

¹Paul Soleilhac, *Le Grand Levrier* (Paris, 1906), 55-62; Louis Bethleem, *La Presse, Son Influence et sa puissance* (Paris, 1926), 331-366; Father Paul Fesch, *Les Souvenirs d'un abbé journaliste* (Paris, 1898), 298-303; *Congrès national du livre. Comité d'organisation. Société des gens de lettres. Cercle de la librairie. Comité du livre. Rapports et résolutions* (Paris, 1917-1922), I, 237-240; E. Kennedy O'Bryne, "The Making of a Great Catholic Newspaper," *Irish Monthly*, VI (1917), 552-563; Virginia M. Crawford, "La Croix and Its Founder, 1832-1932," *Studies*, XXII (1933), 233-240; Father Edouard Lecanuet, *Les Signes avant coureurs* (Paris, 1910), 221-229; Henri Avenel, *Annuaire de la presse française*, VI (1885), 119; VIII (1887), 124; X (1889), 132; XI (1890), 136; XII (1891), 122; XIII (1892), 129-130; XIV (1893), 136-137, 164, 1064; XV (1894), 142, 143, 154, 157, 170; XVI (1895), 145, 149, 174; XVII (1896), 144, 1044; XVIII (1897), 142, 161; XIX (1898), 154; XX (1899), 1034; XXI (1900), 182, 186.

simple explanation. This they found in the Republic, but, most of all, in the use of the Republic by a handful of scheming enemies of the Catholic Church, organized secretly in diabolical societies under the guise of Freemasonry. The Catholic attack on Freemasonry thus became intensified, and after 1880 there was a flood of books denouncing the Masons for their nefarious campaign against religion and against the Catholic Church.

La Croix Revue was founded in 1880 to participate in this campaign to awaken the Catholic masses against the Masons. *La Croix* itself, and all of the other publications produced by the *Maison de la Bonne Presse*, did not have a clear policy concerning the Third Republic itself until late in 1891. From its founding in 1883, *La Croix* was pointedly critical of Republicans and of many Republican institutions, but it did not urge overthrow, or even serious modification of the Republic. This basic issue was raised, however, in 1890 and 1891 when Cardinal Lavigerie and Pope Leo XIII launched the *ralliement* program. The Pope's decision was simply that since the Republic was popular and secure, the Catholic Church should assert its traditional policy of adapting itself to the government in power, so long as the Church's basic interests were not attacked by that government.

La Croix then attempted to combine a "formal" acceptance of this wise policy, "fighting the battles of the Church but not the Republic as such," with a most bitter attack against the Republic, the Republicans, and Republican institutions and laws. Catholic and anti-clerical historians are both in agreement with Cardinal Ferrata, the papal nuncio in Paris at that time, that *La Croix* did more than any other newspaper, with the possible exception of Edouard Drumont's *Libre Parole*, to prevent the success of the Pope's policy. *La Croix* disagreed also with the Pope's analysis of the social evils of the era as expressed in the encyclical *Rerum novarum*. Its social program was very similar to that of most of the other extremely conservative Catholics, for it failed generally to recognize that there were any serious social problems in France. It therefore openly resisted both political and social democracy and thereby helped to widen the gap between the Republic and the majority of the French people on one side and the Church on the other.²

The politics of *La Croix* led the Assumptionists into disastrous

²Father Paul Naudet, *Pourquoi les catholiques ont perdu la bataille* (Paris, 1904), 103-106; Dominique Cardinal Ferrata, *Mémoires. Ma Nonciature en France* (Paris, 1922), 548-560; Antonin Debidour, *L'Eglise catholique et l'Etat sous la Troisième République, 1870-1906* (Paris, 1906-1909), II, 141-142, 372-375; Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, 7, 29-70, 274-276.

allies. Its attitude toward Masonic responsibility for anti-clericalism helped to develop a "plot theory of history," with secret, organized, spiteful minorities being the agents of all change. Thus, *La Croix* became anti-semitic and joined in the campaign which attributed all of the ills of contemporary France to the Jews. It was the first newspaper to review Edouard Drumont's celebrated attack upon the Jews in France, and it praised Drumont's first book, *La France juive*, enthusiastically in 1886.

Its anti-semitism was not particularly strong during the 1880's while the paper and the *Bonne Presse* organization were gradually rising to prominence. However, the early 1890's produced a slight weakening of radical strength in France, as well as a similar increase in conservative strength, so that the attitude of the firmly-established *La Croix* towards the issue of *ralliement* and towards the Republic became more caustic. *La Croix* and its provincial supplements with the *Libre Parole* became the leaders of those opposing *ralliement*. Only the *Libre Parole* was more open and vociferous in its denunciations of the Jews, and *La Croix* and its national organization helped make the Protestants in France a more important target for those who opposed the democratic Third Republic.

After the arrest of Captain Dreyfus in 1894, *La Croix* became even more intemperate in its anti-Republicanism. During 1895, it aroused bitter opposition to the tax on the property of religious orders, in spite of the plea of the papal nuncio. In 1896, Father Adéodat Debaue of the Assumptionists and *La Croix* established a Catholic electoral committee, the *Comité Justice-Egalité*, to support all electoral candidates who would oppose the Masons and Jews and who would struggle against legislation designed to restrict or control the Catholic Church. Managed with the usual efficiency of the Assumptionists, this organization established a nation-wide network, published its own weekly newspaper, and took a prominent part in the elections of 1898 and 1899 in particular.

As the power and prestige of *La Croix* grew and as the crisis of the Dreyfus Affair deepened in France, it became more violent and aggressive. Many Catholics were startled by its excesses, which drew increasing wrath upon the Catholic Church and upon the "political priests." *La Croix* responded to all complaints with the open threat of denunciation and insult against those Catholics, lay and ecclesiastic, who were reluctant to follow its lead. Thus, when Bishop Fuzet of Rouen in 1895 opposed *La Croix's* policy on the tax on religious orders' property, it accused the eminent prelate of seeking the archbishopric of Paris "before it was vacant."

After Dreyfus had been condemned, *La Croix* reported that his wife was going to divorce him and that his family was abandoning him. When anti-semitic riots in Algiers in February, 1898 led to the ransacking of Jewish shops, *La Croix* claimed Christ had protected the Christian ones. It praised the subscription begun by the *Libre Parole* for Colonel Henry, who committed suicide after his forgeries were discovered, declaring that "this manifestation of respect and sympathy" was "a great, comforting, and consoling spectacle." *La Croix de l'Aveyron* cried that "Henry was murdered by assassins who were probably in the pay of the Jews." Many of the provincial *Croix* boasted proudly that they refused to accept advertisements or subscriptions from Jews and Masons.³

The Vatican in 1897 refused the request of the French government that it advise *La Croix* to cease its "organized propaganda campaign" against the Republic. The attempts by French lay and ecclesiastical leaders to induce the editors to moderate their policy also failed. As a consequence, when the tide turned against the anti-Dreyfusards late in 1899, the religious orders and, ultimately, the Catholic Church itself in France, paid a heavy penalty. The Assumptionist congregation was expelled from France in January, 1900, and the entire publishing organization was turned over to a lay Catholic, Paul Féron-Vrau, who possessed few of the abilities the founders of *La Croix* had had in such abundance.

The reactionary politics, the change in leadership, and the shift in political fortunes in France almost destroyed the entire *Maison de la Bonne Presse* organization. With the tide running against the Church even more strongly than it had in the 1879-1884 period and with the Church and State completely separated in 1905, *La Croix's* system tottered weakly. The discredited cause and the less efficient and inspired leadership placed the *Maison de la Bonne Presse* on the verge of bankruptcy in 1908. A hasty campaign for funds raised 3,500,000 francs, and *La Croix* thereupon was able to return to its religious mission with a vigor which political campaigns had led astray. The Catholic renaissance in France after the First World War and this

³Father Joseph Brugerette, *Le Prêtre français et la société contemporaine* (Paris, 1935), II, 442; Joseph Reinach, *Histoire de l'Affaire Dreyfus* (Paris, 1901-1911), I, 490; III, 537; Léon Chaine, *Les Catholiques français et leurs difficultés actuelles devant l'opinion* (Lyon, 1908), 172-173; Ferdinand Mommeja, "Il n'y a pas d'Affaire Dreyfus" (Paris, 1908), 157; Father L. Vial, *Le Juif roi. Comment le détrôner* (Paris, 1897), 6, 35-36, 57-63, 91-93, 105-108; *Le Procès des douze. En Appel. Interrogatoire et plaidoiries. Audiences des 25 et 26 février, 5 et 6 mars 1900* (Paris, 1900), 29-30; Le-canuet, *op. cit.*, 45, 170, 207; Dibidoux, *op. cit.*, II, 190-198.

new attitude towards politics helped restore *La Croix* to a position of great social and religious influence and to justify again the remarkable achievements of Father Bailly in founding the paper and the system.⁴

⁴Georges Lachapelle, *Le Ministère Méline. Deux Années de politique intérieure et extérieure, 1896-1898* (Paris, 1928), 179-181; Lecanuet, *op. cit.*, 209-218; *Le Procès des douze*, 5-238; Debidour, *op. cit.*, II, 264-267; Crawford, *loc. cit.*, 241-244.

THE TREATY OF GHENT:

A STUDY OF DIPLOMACY IN ACTION*

William L. Lucey
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"IT was good fortune rather than foresight," Sumner Welles once said, "that prevented the War of 1812 from bringing in its train disastrous consequences for the people of the United States."¹ This statement can be easily misunderstood. The decision to declare war against Great Britain may have been a blundering departure from the policy of the early administrations, but the triumph of American diplomacy at Ghent, after war had failed, was much more than mere good fortune. The Treaty of Ghent preserved our territorial integrity and nullified the desire and the attempts of the British Foreign Office to impose the terms of a conqueror on a defeated nation, and there would not have been any such treaty if the United States had not been represented by a remarkable group of diplomats. Diplomatic victories are won by brainy statesmen taking full advantage of the turns of events.

The triumph of American diplomacy at Ghent was doubly sweet, for it had failed to prevent war in the first place. It is the function of diplomacy to protect the interests of a nation and to solve the major problems and conflicts with other powers. When diplomacy, the policy of peaceful persuasion, fails, war, the policy of pressure, usually follows. And that was what happened in 1812, although the failure was not entirely the fault of American diplomacy. There were many factors beyond the control of the Madison Administration. The replacing of friendly Erskine by the irascible and overbearing Jackson as the British Minister in September, 1809 was hardly the fault of Madison; the State Department could not be held responsible for the insanity of George III in November, 1810; and the long delay in establishing a regency and the long absence--from the end of 1809 to the summer of 1811--of a British Minister in Washington were not decisions made in Washington.

However, diplomacy had failed and war declared as the last hope of achieving the desired objectives. But Madison had little confidence in war as an instrument of national policy, and hardly had war been

¹S. Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 389.

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declared when he sought the aid of diplomacy to remedy a bad situation. Eight days after the declaration of war our chargé d'affaires in London (unfortunately our capable Minister, William Pinkney, had abandoned all hope of a settlement and had returned home in February, 1811) was instructed to negotiate the ending of the war. An offer of armistice followed in August; in September the administration eagerly seized the Russian offer to mediate. Clearly the administration had little confidence in war as a means of protecting the nation's interests, and there were sound reasons for the lack of confidence. The opportune time for the policy of pressure had passed; Napoleon was on the decline. In her own good time the British Foreign Office offered to negotiate a settlement. The offer came in November, 1813. Madison accepted without delay.

The treaty negotiated at Ghent during August 8, 1814 to December 24 offers a fine opportunity of studying diplomacy in action. One can see forces and factors at work beyond the control of the diplomats. Skilled diplomats, like James Bayard, are aware of the play of these factors, for, in the midst of the negotiations, he told his cousin: "Thus in a great measure does our destiny depend upon operations not under our control, nor within our view."² One can also estimate and appreciate the ability of able diplomats to derive full benefits from the blunders and oversights of the adversaries; one can understand how one party has the advantage on the score of the military situation and uses that advantage; one can see how the home front influences the exchange of opinions at the peace table and how the turn in events is reflected in the progress of negotiations and in the terms of the treaty. With this in mind let us observe the diplomats at Ghent.

THE DIPLOMATS

The United States had a clear and undisputed advantage on the score of diplomats. The best group of men ever to represent the nation at a peace conference were sent to Ghent. The British diplomats were mediocre and acted on occasions as amateurs. Evidently the Americans were not slow to indicate their superiority since one of the British commissioners was soon complaining that the attitude of their opponents "ill became the representatives of a weaker nation in its transactions with the British Empire."³

²Letter to Andrew Bayard, October 26, 1814, "Letters Relating to the Negotiations at Ghent, 1812-1814," *American Historical Review* XX (October, 1914), 123.

³C. K. Webster, "The American War and the Treaty of Ghent," *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922), I, 535.

The best British diplomats were at Vienna redrafting the map of Europe. Lesser brains were assigned to Ghent. Though dictated by necessity, it was pleasant to humble Madison's men by commissioning second rate functionaries like Lord Gambier, Henry Goulborn, and William Adams. The weakness of the British delegation was redeemed by constant instructions from the British Foreign Office; in reality the Americans negotiated with the Foreign Office. But direct contact with London did not prevent the British from committing serious blunders. At the start they presented boundary rectifications in Maine, New York, and west of Lake Superior as equivalent to *sine qua non* demands. Coupled with the demand of an Indian buffer State north of the Ohio, which they were instructed to present as a *sine qua non*, Great Britain appeared as demanding a huge slice of American territory. It was rather simple for the American delegates and Madison to arouse the nation to a high pitch of emotional unity, sadly lacking at the start of the war, against the threatened violation of territorial integrity and independence of the nation.

The American peace commission was an extremely capable and well balanced team: John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, James A. Bayard, and Jonathan Russell. Adams was the spokesman for the East, and Clay the spokesman for the West, but both valued the interests of the nation; Gallatin understood the European mind and methods and was free from sectional prejudices; Bayard was a Federalist and a Senator, a spokesman of the opposition party and of the Senate whose approval of the treaty would be required; Russell had been charge d'affaires in London and was acquainted with the British temper.⁴

The charge that the American group was badly divided needs correction. The source of the charge is *A Great Peacemaker*, the diary kept by James Gallatin, son and secretary of Albert Gallatin. If true, the great advantage in superior ability enjoyed by the Americans would have been nullified. But young Gallatin was not a competent witness, although he had an excellent opportunity as his father's secretary to observe the intimate details of the negotiations. Adams' letters to his wife and father give a different view of the relations of the five commissioners. There were plenty of differences of opinions between the five; they spoke their minds clearly and at times with brutal

⁴The best description of the American delegates will be found in the letters of John Quincy Adams, according to S. F. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), p. 192. Henry Adams discovered one serious defect in the American team: "its excess of strength." *History of the United States of America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), IX, 14.

frankness, but always in their private conferences. Some were not overly fond of each other but they did respect each others' worth. And at the peace table they were one. They did not allow personal differences and animosities to harm the interests of the United States. A comparison between Gallatin's diary and Adams' letters will show how the young secretary misjudged the commissioners.

Under the date of July 15 Gallatin noted in his diary: "Mr. Adams in a very bad temper. Mr. Clay annoys him. Father pours oil on the troubled waters." Adams wrote to his wife the same day but said nothing about being annoyed by Clay; three days before, however, he told his wife: "We are all in perfect good understanding and good humor with one another, and fully determined if we stay here long enough to make a removal from the inn where we all lodge expedient, to take one house and live together."⁵ When Adams confided to his wife or his diary he spoke his mind bluntly and without reserve.

Again, under August 10, Gallatin describes the great difficulties his father had with the American commissioners, implying that they were more of an ordeal than the British, and a violent storm between Clay and Adams is noted. Yet the basic good feelings between the five Americans is a constant theme of Adams' letters. On August 5, he tells his wife: "We begin to be weary, not of one another, but of our bargain for the house;" a week later he adds: "We have the satisfaction of living in perfect harmony; the discontents of our domestic arrangements are all with our landlord, and none with one another."⁶ Late in September he was still able to report: "We are still unanimous in the grounds we take." And two days after the treaty was signed his father was informed:⁷

I have great satisfaction in saying that our harmony has been as great and constant as perhaps ever existed between five persons employed upon so important a trust. Upon almost all the important questions we have been unanimous.

Clearly Adams was unaware of any serious rift between the American commissioners.⁸

⁵*A Great Peace Maker the Diary of James Gallatin* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 27; *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, ed. by W. C. Ford (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915), V, 59.

⁶*A Great Peace Maker*, p. 28; *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, V, 73.

⁷*Writings of John Quincy Adams*, V, 146, 253.

⁸Although Adams defended the work of Russell at Ghent (see *Writings*, V, 131), Russell disliked both Adams and Bayard. See letter of Russell to Crawford, December 23, 1814, *American Historical Review*, XX, 127.

In another passage in his diary Gallatin implies that Adams, the head of the commission, rarely and then grudgingly permitted changes in his drafts of notes. This is completely wrong. Adams expected his conferees to mutilate his drafts and he accepted the changes without any personal feelings against them. In a letter dated September 27, Adams reveals the process of drafting a reply to the British. The process is a remarkable tribute to the five Americans. Gallatin and Adams did most of the original composing, then the other three made their contribution by "altering, erasing, amending, and adding to what we write, as they think proper." A conference followed where the amended draft was criticized and the acceptable parts retained. "In this process about seven-eighths of what I write, and one-half of what Mr. Gallatin writes is struck out." Adams was prepared for this assault on his sections of the draft, for "When I first write I indulge my own feelings, well knowing that the castigation my draft has to pass through will strip it of all its inflammable matter." He, too, was subject to more verbal criticisms than the others, but this he also accepted since "it effectually guards against the ill-effect of my indiscretions." Nor did he begrudge Albert Gallatin the position of real leader of the group. He readily admitted that "Gallatin keeps and increases his influence over us all. It would have been an irreparable loss if our country had been deprived of the benefit of his talents in this negotiation."⁹ Rarely did five strong characters work so well together. All differences were honestly thrashed out in the privacy of conferences; a united front was presented to the British at the peace table. This was the key to their success at Ghent.

THE HOME FRONT

The advantages of the home front shifted. At the beginning the British enjoyed the advantages, but the situation deteriorated and deprived them of any superiority. In America the home front improved during the negotiations.

There was the spirit of discontent and opposition to the war in New England and talk of a convention and secession. The British were, of course, aware of this. Yet this lack of unity behind the administration did not noticeably weaken the American delegation, for New England was represented at the peace talks by America's finest diplomat and the discontent was exaggerated as the Hartford Convention fiasco proved. The British were unable to profit from this lack of unity.

⁹Adams to his wife, September 27, 1814, *Writings*, V, 146-148.

The high optimism of the Americans at the beginning of the war, an optimism without any solid grounds and best expressed by Clay's boast of dictating a peace at Halifax, had soon disappeared after the first attempt to invade Canada. The Americans were anxious for peace; Madison had made that clear. But the Americans could be aroused to burning indignation and resolve to fight it out for years. Such a wave of indignation did sweep the States when Madison revealed the excessive demands of Great Britain for huge sections of American territory. The American delegation was strengthened by the slogan: "Don't give up the soil," while the British were manoeuvred into the awkward position of a ruthless, grasping power. It was not mere bluff on Clay's part when he told the British commissioners, just two weeks before the signing of the treaty, that the United States was ready "for a war three years longer" rather than submit to dishonorable terms.

The British people could not be aroused to any such enthusiasm. They had been at war almost continuously since 1793; they were tired of war and the burdens of war, and were most eager for peace. Bayard had found the temper of England highly excited against the Americans before the negotiations got under way,¹⁰ but this was more the talk of the important newspapers than the inarticulate people. The *London Times* was for chastising "the savages," but the British Foreign Office discovered that would be a costly proposition. Early in November, after the news of McDonough's victory at Plattsburg Bay and the retreat of Provost arrived, the Foreign Office readily admitted that a vigorous prosecution of the war would entail staggering expenses, "much more than the estimated 10 million pounds,"—a high price to pay to chastise the Americans in return for better boundaries for Canadians and the protection of Indians.¹¹ The financial situation was one of the factors that compelled the British to retreat from their supposedly impregnable position at the peace table.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

There is no doubt where the advantages of the military situation lay. There was scarcely any basis for a comparison of military power. Great Britain was the leader of the coalition that had defeated and had forced the abdication of Napoleon April 13, 1814. The British forces were free to crush the United States, and a part of Wellington's veterans had been ordered to America. The British naval power had driven American ships off the Atlantic; the unexpected victories

¹⁰Letter to Andrew Bayard, August 6, 1814, *American Historical Review*, XX, 113.

¹¹H. Adams, *History of the United States*, IX, 38-39.

of our frigates during 1812, extremely humiliating defeats to British pride at the time, had been forgotten. The American navy could not boast of one ship of the line—a capital ship—during the entire war. On the score of manpower, of actual military and naval power, of economic potential and actual strength, it was difficult to see where the Americans had a gambler's chance of success. Only the geographical factor favored the Americans: the Atlantic and the necessity of transporting the British might across the ocean, and the crucial importance in this war of the fresh water lakes: the Great Lakes and Champlain.

The British deliberately delayed negotiations to give Wellington's veterans time to deliver the *coup de grâce*. They kept the Americans cooling their heels at Ghent for a month before opening the discussions, and then they handed the Americans what Bayard considered were terms "of a Conqueror to a conquered People."¹² Late in August the time apparently was at hand. The British invaded Washington, burning the government buildings and moving onto Baltimore; from the north Provost was ready to strike and invade New York *via* Lake Champlain; from the south Pakenham's army was moving onto New Orleans. The Americans at Ghent were disconsolate. Clay wished it "were possible to pass over in silence, and bury in oblivion, the distressing events which have occurred at home." To the British the capture "of Washington was a source of great triumph and exultation and inspired a belief that their troops could not be resisted."¹³ It was the opportune time to press for territorial demands based on a *uti possidetis* clause.

Yet this primacy of military power was nullified by a few unpredictable events. The British failed to take Baltimore and lost General Ross in the attempt. Coupled with the indignation over the needless destruction of Washington the spirits of the victory-famed Americans revived. Crawford happily told Adams that the "spirit which the destruction of Washington has excited is generally what it ought to be," and readily agreed with him that "we shall have a good peace, if the war is prosecuted a year or two longer."¹⁴ There was no need of waiting for a year. On September 12, 1814 McDonough destroyed or captured the British naval fleet at Plattsburg Bay. It was the turning point of the negotiations. As Bayard informed his cousin, the belief that the British troops were irresistible was corrected "by the repulse in the attack upon Baltimore, by the destruction of their fleet on Lake

¹²Letter to Robert G. Harper, August 19, 1814, *American Historical Review*, XX, 116.

¹³Letter to Andrew Bayard, October 26, 1814, *ibid.*, XX, 122.

¹⁴Letter of Crawford to Adams, October 26, 1814, *ibid.*, XX, 124.

Champlain and by the retreat of Prevost from Plattsburg."¹⁵ The American peace commissioners refused to negotiate on the principle of *uti possidetis*.

McDonough's victory was the turning point. The Americans now controlled the avenue of invasion from Canada. Prevost did not dare risk a battle, though his army outnumbered the Americans by five to one. To break this threatened stalemate Great Britain had to decide on a more extensive and expensive prosecution of the war. Without control of the Lakes, an invasion of New York from Canada, the separation of New England from the rest of the States, an occupation of a large section of the United States were out of the question. This was the military situation when the British Foreign Office asked Wellington to take command in America.

Wellington gave his answer November 9. He had no objections to going to America but he could not promise himself much success there. What was needed there was not more troops and a General, but naval superiority on the Lakes. The question is, he added:¹⁶

whether we can acquire this naval superiority on the Lakes. If we can't I can do you little good in America: and I shall go there only to prove the truth of Prevost's defense, and to sign a peace which might as well be signed now. . . . In regard to your present negotiations I confess that I think you have no right from the state of the war to demand any concession of territory from America.

Nine days after Wellington's answer was written, the British Foreign Office instructed their delegation at Ghent to abandon the principle of *uti possidetis*.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

The British commissioners were supremely confident of imposing their terms on the Americans. Their strategy, conceived by the British Foreign Office, called for a delay in the negotiations until the British forces scored decisive victories and occupied important areas of enemy territory. Hence, they pushed one demand at a time.

The Americans had no advantages at the beginning except the clear superiority of ability over their opponents at the peace table. But they soon discovered that they were actually negotiating with the British Foreign Office, whereas they themselves had little contact with the American Department of State. However, this lack of communications

¹⁵Letter to A. Bayard, October 26, 1814, *ibid.*, XX, 122-123.

¹⁶Webster, *op. cit.*, I, 539-540.

with Washington was not a serious impediment. By the time negotiations opened they had received Madison's instructions of June 27, instructions dictated by the success of England and her allies in Europe, which freed them from making an end of impressment a *sine qua non* of any treaty. They were now free to negotiate any terms that respected the territorial integrity of the United States. They were on their own. A remark of Clay prior to the negotiations would indicate that they intended to depend more on their own judgment than on instructions from Washington; he told Crawford that "if I were persuaded that the interests of our Country demanded of me the personal risk of a violation of instructions I should not hesitate to incur it."¹⁷ And if they found that they needed time they could argue that they awaited further instructions from home.

The Americans had no solid hope of an acceptable treaty as negotiations finally were opened on August 8. "My hopes of peace are very slender," Bayard wrote his cousin on August 6, and two weeks later, after they had had several conferences with the British, he was of the same mind: "At the last [conference] such terms were prescribed as put an end to all hopes of peace."¹⁸ Their plan, then, was conditioned on an expected break in the negotiations. They would play what few cards they had so that the break in the negotiations could be presented to the American people as the sole responsibility of the British,—to their thirst for revenge and determination to partition the new republic. This would unite the people and arouse them to fight for a favorable peace. Clay expressed this idea to Crawford: "so to conduct negotiations as to satisfy the nation that a vigorous and united exertion alone will preserve it."¹⁹ Still, they did not know what the future would bring. They would put on a bold front, assume an attitude of at least an equal, and see whether time would be more favorable to them than to the British. They would so "manage negotiations as to take advantage in the turn of events here or at home."²⁰

That was the key to their success as able diplomats: so manage the negotiations as to take advantage in the turn of events in Europe, in England, and in America. Just how successful they were against great odds may be seen by recalling the major objectives of the British Foreign Office. They wanted to annex the old Northwest down to the Ohio River or to make it an Indian buffer State. They wanted rectification of the northern boundaries of New York and Maine. These two

¹⁷Letter to Crawford, July 2, 1814, *American Historical Review*, XX, 111.

¹⁸Letter to A. Bayard, August 6 and 20, 1814, *ibid.*, XX, 113-114.

¹⁹Letter to Crawford, July 2, 1814, *ibid.*, XX, 111.

²⁰*Ibid.*

territorial demands would make the Great Lakes the Exclusive domain of Great Britain. They wanted to settle the boundaries of the United States on the basis of *uti possidetis*,--the territory occupied by the two parties at the end of the war. The expected victories promised British occupation of key areas such as New Orleans. They wanted the fishing rights enjoyed by the Americans to cease after the treaty. They wanted to retain the free navigation of the Mississippi, a privilege granted in 1783 on the mistaken notion that the river's source was in Canada but now known to be in the United States since Pike's expedition of 1805-1806. After five months of negotiations the British signed a treaty which did not include a single one of these major objectives.

How explain the retreat of the British from their original objectives and their final acceptance of the *status quo ante bellum*? There were many factors, some of them, as Bayard anticipated, beyond the control of the American delegates.

The most important factor was the exceptional ability of the American commissioners. Had the Madison administration ignored them and sent a mediocre delegation to Ghent, as has happened on later occasions of peace making, the history of the United States would have been far different than it now is. It is not difficult to imagine the differences with a buffer State north of the Ohio River and the Great Lakes exclusively under the control of Great Britain. The American delegation prevented the surrender of any important territory. And they did it by a strong, unified front at the peace table, by taking full advantage of the turn of events at home and abroad, by their willingness to continue the war in preference to dishonorable terms. Though they were free to forget about impressment, they made no move to do so until the British had abandoned the idea of a buffer State and the principle of *uti possidetis* as the basis of territorial settlement.

They were aided by the improvement of morale in America. The excessive demands of the British, publicized by Madison, and the burning of the government buildings in Washington created a unified and angry resistance. They were greatly aided by McDonough's victory on Lake Champlain. The expected British invasion from the north was thwarted. Unless the British Foreign Office was willing to make the effort to regain control of the Lakes, her peace commissioners had no grounds for pushing territorial demands.

At this point Wellington came to the aid of the Americans. His decision persuaded the Foreign Office to make peace without achieving the major objectives. This decision was supported by other considerations: affairs were not progressing satisfactorily at Vienna and

France was seething with unrest. And besides a vigorous prosecution of the war would mean heavy financial expenses, more than the war weary Britons could stand. The British Foreign Office decided to accept a stalemate at Ghent, although during the spring and summer of 1814 England was, according to Henry Adams, "beside herself with the intoxication of European success."

It was no stalemate for the Americans. It was a clear cut diplomatic victory that kept the London *Times* grumbling editorially for weeks, and sent the town of Boston into a uproar with cannons firing, drums beating, bells ringing, gentlemen shaking hands and congratulating each other," and ladies running wildly about." It was "a day never to be forgotten by anyone who enjoyed it."²¹

²¹M. A. DeWolfe Howe (ed.), *The Articulate Sisters* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 12.

THOMAS FRANCIS O'CONNOR

Thomas Francis O'Connor died unexpectedly on the morning of September 15, at St. Mary's Hospital, Saint Louis, Missouri, at the age of fifty-one. The cause of the death was internal hemorrhaging from a perforated ulcer, which began during his return from a research trip to visit some of the Catholic archives of the Northwest. During the past year Mr. O'Connor had been associate professor of history, Saint Louis University, and a member of the editorial board of THE HISTORICAL BULLETIN. His premature passing robs American scholarship of one of the outstanding authorities on the history of the Catholic Church in the United States.

A graduate of the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts, in the Class of '22, Mr. O'Connor was soon attracted to the field of his future interest. After obtaining his Master's degree from Syracuse University, in the city of his birth, he taught at Little Rock Arkansas, then became a graduate fellow at Saint Louis University, and subsequently held the appointment of instructor in history. After two years at Saint Michael's College, Vermont, he accepted the position of historiographer for the Diocese of Syracuse and subsequently, from 1943-1948, occupied a like position in the archives of the Archdiocese of New York. In 1946 he served as president of the American Catholic Historical Association; he was closely connected with several other Catholic historical groups, notably in New York and in Philadelphia. Though a frequent contributor to the learned journals, few of his longer studies had as yet reached print. THE HISTORICAL BULLETIN regrets the loss of his sage advice and generous editorial cooperation.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Manual of Government Publications, by Everett S. Brown. New York. Appleton-Century-Croft. pp. ix and 121, no index. \$2.00

This is the 22nd publication of the Century Political Science Series and may well prove the most useful since it is a handy guide to publications, chiefly official, of nearly every country. This will become a sort of *vade mecum* for many people.

J.P.D.

An American History, by Merle Curti, Richard H. Shryock, Thomas C. Cochran, Fred Harvey Harrington. Volume One. New York. Harper & Brothers. pp. 657. \$4.50

This volume is splendid proof that American historiography is growing up and that the survey text for the history of the United States is benefiting from this new maturity. The authors, a splendidly balanced team—Curti for social and intellectual, Shryock for scientific, the colonial and southern, Cochran for economic, Harrington for political, military, and diplomatic—have essayed the topical approach to the American story with much success. This has allowed them to make some significant departures from the ordinary textbook patterns. The chapter titles of Part II (1763-1815) will indicate the implementation of this idea: The American Revolution, The Problem of Government, Toward a National Economy, Social and Cultural Change, and Building an American Foreign Policy. Volume One is divided into four parts—1492-1763, 1763-1815, 1815-1850, 1850-1877. The choice of 1877 as a division point is another interesting departure—and, we think, soundly justified. It thus allows Volume Two, promised for the late fall, to deal with Industrial America unencumbered, so to speak.

The five bibliographical essays at the end of the volume, the first on "General References" and the others for each of the four parts, are helpful tools to student and professor alike. The maps—thirteen in the present volume—employ a two-color technique to advantage.

This volume deserves careful consideration by the teacher who would infuse new life into the general survey course on the history of the United States. It is fresh and stimulating.

John F. Bannon.

The Decline of the Medieval Cistercian Laybrotherhood, by James Donnelly. New York. Fordham University Press. 1949. pp. 95. (Fordham University Studies. History Series. No. 3.)

Although the main outlines of monastic history have received considerable attention, very little is known concerning the *conversi*, the lay-brothers. Literature in English on this institution is almost non-existent. The present study purports to examine the reasons why this institution, which had proved so beneficial in the first two centuries of Cistercian history, finally declined and disappeared in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The introduction of lay-brothers was a radical departure from the Benedictine system which required manual labor for all. Introduced originally into the Italian monasteries of Fonte Avellana, Camaldoli and Vallombrosa, and into the German congregation of Hirschau, the *conversi* were instituted to release the monks from manual labor and the care of material needs in order that they might devote more time to meditation and intellectual pursuits. They were ideally suited for the newly-organized Cistercian order which founded its abbeys far from populated centers. The *conversi* made the strict observance of the Cistercian rule possible and contributed much to the remarkable expansion and prosperity of the Order.

Almost from its origin, however, the institution contained seeds of trouble. Since they were conscripted mainly from among unlettered peasants, the problem of discipline was always a difficult one. A contributory complication was the drinking of wine and beer on granges, or farms, against which the general chapters legislated repeatedly but without success. The extent to which the *conversi* proved a thorn within the life of the Order is attested by the 123 recorded revolts between the years 1168 and 1308.

By the thirteenth century the number of lay-brothers was being restricted where revolts had broken out and was dropping by reason of a lack of aspirants. But even more responsible for the decline of the institution was the change in the economic principles of the Order. In the first quarter of the thirteenth century permission was granted to rent Cistercian land to outsiders; this rendered the *conversi* no longer an indispensable part of the Cistercian community.

The study is well documented and annotated, and of interest is the complete list of 123 revolts in the 1168-1308 period. It is hoped that the author will continue his study on the economic basis of the monastic houses in the Middle Ages and especially into the relation of the monastic economy to the general European economy. His present contribution throws much light on a little-known subject and will

prove useful both to the student of monastic and medieval economic history.

Anthony F. Czajkowski.

The German Social Democratic Party, 1914-1921, by A. Joseph Berlau. New York. Columbia University Press. 1949. pp. 374. \$4.75

The Social Democratic Party was created in 1875 by the fusion of the two important socialist groups in Germany: the followers of Lassalle, and those of Marx. At the end of the First World War this was the largest single party in Germany, one apparently in a position at least to try revolutionizing the country along Marxian lines. Something had happened to the Social Democratic Party, however, both in regard to its doctrine and its practical party activity. It was no longer desirous of effecting the revolution; instead, it saved all it could of the old imperial institutions.

The author of this monograph assumes the task of tracing the SPD's history in considerable detail through the war period down till 1921 in order to show just how and why this abandonment of Marxian theory and practice came about. His thesis is that the combination of Lassallean and Marxian elements never blended into a single program or doctrine. He shows the Marxian element predominant until about 1900, when Lassallean ideas began to emerge as a stronger element within the SPD. During the war the party supported measures to win the war, contrary as they were to official party theory. The war proved to the party leaders that the people were nationalist rather than communist, and it soon realized that Marx's theory of a disintegrating capitalist society was not working out in practice. So the party adjusted itself to these realities and abandoned Marxism.

Dr. Berlau upholds his thesis well. He presents in careful, scholarly form a considerable amount of information hitherto unavailable in English on the evolution of the SPD from Marxism to a modern form of socialism.

Thomas P. Neill.

A History of the Old South, by Clement Eaton. New York. Macmillan. 1949. pp. ix, 636. \$5.00

Mr. Eaton has produced a readable, well-organized history of the region known as "Dixie" from its seventeenth-century beginnings to its attempted secession from the Union. In his study, the author has intentionally sacrificed much of routine historical data in the interest of stressing those factors which built in the South a conception of

"Southernism" in thought and culture.

The problem of how such a distinct regional point of view came into being has been explored often and many explanatory hypotheses have been offered, including those of geography, of politics, of the Negro problem, etc. Mr. Eaton combines all of these approaches in greater or less measure and has mingled them well. He has, in addition, stressed what seems to be the current trend in Southern historical writing, the logical idea that the South and Southern views were the creation of all classes in the area, not the result of the aristocratic planter class alone.

A part of the last paragraph in this volume will perhaps be read with varying opinions in an era when uniformity seems to have become the great ideal. Says Mr. Eaton, "Today the South remains the most selfconscious of American sections and for years to come is likely to preserve its deep regional feeling. Such a state of feeling may be a powerful force for good, since it resists the standardization of life in America. The true function of this regionalism is to preserve the rich variety of life in the United States."

An excellent bibliography greatly enhances the value of the book.

Jasper W. Cross.

Silas Wright, by John Arthur Garraty. New York. Columbia University Press. 1949. pp. 426. \$5.00

The subject of this biography was a conspicuous political figure of the Jacksonian era. Born in Massachusetts, his boyhood years were spent in Vermont, where he graduated from Middlebury College in 1815. After studying law at Sandy Hill, now Hudson Falls, New York, he was admitted to the New York bar in 1819, and thereafter remained in a pre-eminent manner a "Yorker." Elected to the state Senate in 1823, he went on to Congress in 1827. In 1829 he became comptroller of the state of New York, but resigned that office in 1833 to fill out the unexpired term of William L. Marcy in the United States Senate. Re-elected in 1837 and 1843, he resigned from the Senate in 1844, and in the same year was elected Governor of New York. Defeated by the Whig candidate in the election of 1846, he retired to his farm near Canton, New York, where he died on August 27, 1847.

Throughout his entire public life Wright remained a staunch Democrat. Affiliating early in his political career with the "Bucktails," he labored consistently to effect that organization's objective,—the subversion of the power of De Witt Clinton and of the forces of privilege in New York politics. With the rise to power of the "Albany Regency" upon the appointment of the Bucktail leader, Martin Van Buren, to

the United States Senate in 1821, Wright found himself well established in political favor through the good offices of his former legal mentor, Roger Skinner, a prominent member of the "Regency." During his term in the State senate as well as later during his governorship, he steadfastly resisted all proposals for the extension of the state's internal waterways except where anticipated revenues gave sound assurance of reimbursement to the State treasury. In the national legislature he cast his influence in favor of a tariff protective of both agriculture and manufactures, and supported the "tariff of abominations" of 1828, Clay's compromise bill of 1833, and the tariff of 1842. As chairman of the Senate finance committee from December, 1836 to March, 1841 he opposed the re-chartering of the Bank of the United States.

Silas Wright has not gone without biographers. His death occasioned the preparation of those by Jenkins and Hammond, and in 1874 appeared Ransom H. Gillet's two volume *Life and Times of Silas Wright*. All of these have now been superseded by Garraty's work. Despite Wright's practice of destroying his incoming correspondence as soon as its immediate utility had passed, the author has succeeded in locating an impressive quantity of Wright's letters to his contemporaries. These, together with the published memoirs and correspondence of the leading political figures of the day, provided the data from which the present study has been written. Following the accepted norms of historical scholarship, the narrative is fully documented and references are given their rightful place at the foot of the pages. The lapse of a century has provided prospective, and the quieting of emotions has permitted the author to form a measured judgment of the actions and motives of Wright's political life.

Apart from the interest it should revive in its once nationally prominent subject, the volume will prove of substantial value and interest to all students of the era of Jackson. The bibliography lists the various manuscript collections used, the files of the local and national press consulted, and the printed primary sources and secondary works that have furnished material on Wright's career. The index, although comprehensive, is uneven.

Thomas F. O'Connor.

The Golden Age of Colonial Culture, by Thomas J. Wertenbaker. New York. New York University Press. 1949. pp. 171. \$3.00

This is the second edition of a work first published in 1942. Professor Wertenbaker has produced a well written account of the cultural achievements of Boston, New York, Charleston, Williamsburg,

Annapolis and Philadelphia,—cities which were centers of colonial culture in the mid-18th century East. By "cultural achievements" the author means advancements made in art, music, literature, the theatre, architecture, science, education, and certain skills such as furniture making.

The book contains a great deal of interesting and unusual factual material. There is nothing unusual however, about the author's conclusions—that the colonial culture of the cities mentioned above was borrowed in large measure from England and was then acted upon and changed by forces at work in this country—and that these "forces at work" varied greatly. Thus Boston, for example, grew culturally along different lines than did Charleston. Except for the footnotes scattered throughout the book, there is no bibliography.

Edward J. Maguire

The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907, by William Alexander Jenks.
New York. Columbia University Press. 1950. pp. 227. \$3.25

This is a well done, fairly presented and scholarly written study about the problems of Central-European representative democracy that offers more to the reader than the title of the book might indicate. It is not a matter of exclusively historic interest; at least, not for the student concerned with research about chances and risks of genuine parliamentary bodies in some kind of a future large-scale federation. Former Austria-Hungary with her total population of 52 Millions out of 12 different nationalities represented, indeed, a sort of an European microcosm; so we may easily recognize in the former Austrian mirror most of the later European crucial problems. None of them was really insoluble, but very few thus far have been resolved in a completely satisfactory manner. The unbiased observer had better forget those well established prejudices which ask him to conceive in an over-all picture the late "Hapsburg-Monarchy" as the very incarnation of political iniquity and of devilish despotism. He is supposed to approach his topic objectively—that is what W. A. Jenks tried successfully to do. His final conclusions will be therefore well balanced judgments.

The reform of 1907 brought to the Austrian part of the Empire (not to Hungary) universal manhood suffrage for the Reichsrat-elections (the central Austrian House of Representatives). Our author considers this reform "the last important step to reconcile the great contradictions within the empire," embodied in divergent nationalistic and democratic forces. As a matter of fact universal suffrage in Austria was supposed to check centrifugal nationalistic forces, in other words to sever an alliance *contra naturam* concluded in the 19th century between Nationalism and Democracy. Our author considers the reform of

1907 the last one "of the delaying actions" under Mettemich's successors, determined to prevent the dissolution of the empire and, as we might just as well add, the disintegration of Central-Europe. "Unfortunately"—the attempt failed. Also in this respect the author is right in drawing his final conclusions. It was not at the troubled front of home-politics, not through any socialist or other ideological opposition, it was on the international field of World-politics that the death-warrant of Austria-Hungary was signed and executed.

The student of recent central-European history will certainly gain profit from the analysis of Austrian-German and Czech political parties and party-platforms as they then existed. He will take notice of the various subdivisions within the national groups, separated as they were from each other by mainly ideological lines. He will recognize that there had not been only a permanent struggle between Germans and Slavs, but another even more bitter between Poles and Ruthenes (Ukrainians). It is worthwhile to remember how the Social-Democrats with their able leaders tried in vain to defend their international platform against the nationalist trends of non-German socialist party-organizations; or on the other side the opposite views of Catholic conservatives and Christian-socials in the German speaking provinces of Austria, leading to bitter struggle over principle issues, until a final fusion was reached that virtually survived the monarchy.

It is a good idea for students of constitutional law and recent history of the Central-European Successor-States to search for background information in pre-1918 Austrian parliamentary files; they will meet there many familiar names and ideas. Jenk's book may serve them as a reliable guide. Certain details of the narrative remain open to debate. For instance, the author following an established but unfounded custom refers to the Austrian "Christian Socialists." As in Belgium (*sociaux Chretien*)—and unlike France (e.g. Radical-Socialists)—the Christian social reformers called themselves Christian-Socials, the term Socialism in German speaking countries being generally used for derivations from K. Marx' doctrines only.

If the author refers to the once popular Austrian deputy Count Sternberg as an "unpredictable part of the radical (Czech) nationalist group who continued his independent war upon the empire and the dynasty" (p. 188), he is certainly right as to Sternberg's unpredictable moods. But this man certainly never belonged to a "nationalist group," being a group for himself. Sternberg opposed occasionally—and more for fun than seriously—the emperor, but never the dynasty or the empire; as a matter of fact he survived the downfall of the monarchy for a couple of years as one of its most fervent protagonists.

Another statement (p. 206): "Austria went to destruction thanks to Berchtold (Foreign Minister in 1914) and apathy" hits the mark, but should not be taken by itself. As any attentive reader will easily recognize, it seemed at least highly doubtful, whether the Parliament as it existed since the elections of 1911, could be expected to offer sound and prompt advice when the fateful hour of decision struck. Europe was actually divided into a pro-German (Triple alliance) and a pro-Russian Block (Triple Entente). The Austrian parliament was divided too, and had a rival parliament of different structure, burdened with the same problems, nearby in Budapest. As a whole Jenks' book deserves high credit and is recommended to students of Central European History and Comparative Government.

Kurt Schuschnigg

The Colonial Craftsmen, by Carl Bridenbaugh. New York. New York University Press. 1950. pp. 214. \$4.25

Mr. Bridenbaugh, Director of the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, has long bemoaned the fact that American Universities and American historians are neglecting the first half of American history. He greatly fears the misconceptions of American history that will flow from the overemphasis of the contemporary and the concurrent ignorance of colonial backgrounds. Thus he has devoted many years to the study of Colonial history and has produced several monographs dealing with colonial life.

The present work, *The Colonial Craftsmen*, fits in rather well with the pattern established by the other works. It treats of craftsmen in a broad sense of the word—meaning almost anyone who worked, whether the job be wallpaper hanging, manufacturing potash or running a mill. The author's emphasis is evidently on the individual rather than the product. Therefore there is no attempt to explain the development of a typical—or in some cases a unique—American commodity. Mr. Bridenbaugh is much more interested in the contributions *The Colonial Craftsmen* made to society. He wishes to (and does) make the reader aware that the 18th century artisan was very often a trained, skilled expert, capable of excellent workmanship. The footnotes are to be found collected in the back of the book where, Mr. Bridenbaugh says, "they will not annoy the casual reader." In absence of any other they must also serve as an uncritical bibliography.

Edward J. Maguire

Eloquent Indian. The Life of James Bouchard, California Jesuit, by John Bernard McGloin, S.J., Ph.D. California. Stanford University Press. 1949. pp. xviii-389. \$3.00.

There is nothing fantastic about the name of this fine book; it treats of an "Indian," and the idea behind that word runs throughout the entire volume; and this Indian's place in history is owing to the fact that he was "Eloquent." If we accept Archbishop Riordan's estimate of his worth, he surely merited a place in history. This extremely well-documented biography fully verifies his Excellency's eulogy: "To no man in the West is the Church of God more beholden than to James Bouchard of the Society of Jesus. He kept the faith in the mining districts; he sustained the dignity of God's Holy Church in the midst of ignorance and misunderstanding, and everywhere championed her rights. My debt to him, and I speak for my brother Bishops, is incalculable."

This critique is somewhat belated. The press, especially the Catholic press, has hailed the book with uniform welcome. Here then, let us accept that general approbation as our own, and confine our estimate of the work to two small items of a somewhat personal character that may be of special interest to the reader, and simultaneously highlight just one feature of the very many that in the character of the subject of this biography and in the accuracy of its author, well merit attention.

Eloquence in its highest stages carries something of a hypnotic effect on its hearers. The Eloquent Indian certainly enjoyed this power. More than sixty years ago, this critic saw and heard Father Bouchard carrying on a conversation with a group of young Jesuits. I saw him just once, and had not yet heard of the romantic fact that his mother was a French child that had been a captive of the Indians, the Comanches, and that he himself as a boy had fought beside his Delaware Indian father in a battle against the Sioux; yet, after all these years, I can close my eyes and see him clearly. I met his emulator, Father Damen, almost the same year, but my mental vision of him derives from his pictures; of Bouchard the vision is of the reality.

The hypnotic eloquence in Father McGloin's case bore rich fruit, as this volume testifies. Let me illustrate the reliability of the book by a little incident.

Father Laurence Mulhern, who under the pseudonym of R. C. Gleaner, carried an interesting column weekly in the *Catholic Columbian*, on the occasion of a lecturing tour that brought him to St. Louis,

casually mentioned that he was the first Catholic who had attended Marietta College, Ohio, or did he say that he was the only Catholic priest who had studied there? In either case, whichever he said, I called his attention to Father Bouchard's presence there long before his date. He was intensely interested. We debated the matter at the time and later by a long correspondence. He could not be convinced. Finally he went to Marietta and looked over the complete roster of all the students. There was no Bouchard, Beshor, or any other name like it, anywhere in the student register through all the years. Father McGloin disposes of this difficulty in a brief footnote at page 58, where he offers unimpeachable evidence that "Jacob" (James) "Besor" (Bouchard) was a student "of the Latin School which was maintained in connection with Marietta College." Fr. Mulhern evidently had not seen the catalogues of the old Latin school. The unravelling of that difficulty cost Fr. McGloin considerable correspondence and travel, it might have been expected that in consequence, the incident would occupy considerable space in the volume, rather than a mere footnote. In the author's fine judgment, it did not weigh heavily in the scale of importance. Evidently he had many important matters to present his readers. In this volume, he has made a contribution of lasting value to the history of Religion in California and in America.

A word must be added in commendation of the Stanford University Press. It were difficult to name anything wanting to make this book a pleasure to look at as well as to read. The correspondence of paper and type is such that the small mica printing is so clear that its reading is almost restful even to weak eyes.

Lawrence Kenny

Jesuit Relations and Other Americana in the Library of James F. Bell, compiled by Frank K. Walter and Virginia Doneghy. University of Minnesota Press. 1950. pp. xii, 419. \$25.00.

Among historians interested in Jesuit materials, it has been known for some time that Mr. James F. Bell of Minneapolis collected original editions of the Jesuit Relations. It will probably be no small surprise to that same group to find how nearly complete the collection has become, now that we have a published bibliography of that collection to which has also been added a bibliography of other valuable Americana collected by Mr. Bell. This bibliography is more than a carefully edited listing of the materials contained in Mr. Bell's collection. In reality, the first part of the book is fairly close to a definitive bibliography of the Jesuit Relations. This fact, in itself, is sufficient to

recommend the book since neither McCoy nor Thwaites nor Kenton compiled such a complete listing of the various editions of the Relations.

There are some questions which users of the book will naturally ask. We would liked to have been assured that the excellent Bell collection is to be made available eventually to the general historical public. Also, a brief note of how Mr. Bell came to build the collection would have been most interesting, both for the present and the future. The story of important collections such as this is always of interest. It might be briefly noted that the publishers are asking a great deal of money for their book. The information is excellent, but not completely unavailable in other sources. This is a book for libraries chiefly and not for the general purchaser.

Joseph P. Donnelly.

Nationalism and Internationalism. Essays Inscribed to Carlton J. H. Hayes, edited by Edward Mead Earle. New York. Columbia University Press. 1950. pp. xvii, 510. \$5.75.

About twenty years ago Hilaire Belloc called nationalism "the great modern heresy." Whether historians call it heresy, ideology, attitude, or climate of opinion, all agree that nationalism has been a most important factor in the last century of world history. It is therefore a subject demanding investigation, analysis and description by social and cultural historians. But nationalism is so pervasive a phenomenon, so chameleon-like, that to define it is impossible and to describe it is most difficult.

As all historians now know, Carlton J. H. Hayes set about studying this phenomenon from his strategically located position as professor of history at Columbia University. Through his own work and through the studies of many capable students doing their doctoral study under him, we have been given a sizeable literature describing the various kinds of nationalism in modern history. This has been the most important work of Carlton J. H. Hayes.

It is therefore fitting that Hayes' former students should inscribe a volume of essays on nationalism and internationalism to their great teacher on his retirement. There are seventeen such essays, all of them meeting the tests of sound scholarship and—wonderful to say!—all of them well written. The authors include such well known historians as Robert Ergang, Walter Consuelo Langsam, Jacques Barzun, Edward Mead Earle, and Beatrice F. Hyslop. Some of the essays are studies of some individual's contribution to nationalism: as Jesse

Clarkson's work on "Big Jim" Larkin, Thomas Peardon's analysis of Sir John Seeley's nationalism, or John Gazley's essay on Arthur Young. Others deal with wider problems: Beatrice Hyslop, for example, making a study of the spread of French Jacobin nationalism to Spain, or John Wuorinen describing the rise of modern national consciousness in the Scandinavian world.

These essays, in this reviewer's opinion, add up to another valuable volume, analyzing the role of nationalism in modern history. They are a fitting tribute to the great teacher under whose guidance these capable historians began their careers.

Thomas P. Neill.

Ozark Folksongs, Vol. IV. Collected by Vance Randolph. Edited by Floyd Shoemaker and Frances G. Emberson. Published by the State Historical Society of Missouri. 1950. Sold only as a four-volume set, \$15.80.

This is the final volume of what is probably the most complete collection of folksongs in the world that covers so small, yet so distinctive, a section of a nation. To the historian who ambitions to sense the heart of a people rather than merely observe their external activities, this is an invaluable collection. Dr. Phillip D. Jourdan of the University of Minnesota evaluates it as "one of the most unique and distinguished contributions to American life ever made by any historical society." To all who know the excellent output of several of our historical societies, this is very high, but, we think, well merited praise.

The numerous membership of the State Historical—more numerous than that of any other Historical Society of any of our forty-eight states—will congratulate themselves for having chosen the officers who edited a work that brings so much honor to Missouri. Would that the State Legislature, whose assistance to the Society is less than that of many smaller states, might realize the worth of these generous and able workers.

This Fourth volume carries a forty-page Index of the four volumes, compiled by Dr. Shoemaker. It includes 883 songs with musical notation, and 1,644 texts. Not a few of these songs are, for the most part, ridiculous doggerel. These had to be included in the interest of truth, but even in these at times a note of rich poetic value gleams out like a sparkle of gold in its native quartz.

The first section of the present volume is "religious" and it witnesses to the painful fact that all the joyousness of the Christian

evangel, "the glad tidings," is heard only in echoes that float through the shades and about the crags of the mountains ever more faintly; the clarion notes of the Angels that rang out over the cave where Mary and Joseph were adoring our God in far-off Palestine died out before they reached the Ozarks; there is no Mary or Joseph or Angels in the lonesome hearts or in the music of those regions.

Lawrence Kenny.

Jesuit and Savage in New France by J. H. Kennedy. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1950. 206 pages.

Mr. Kennedy has hit upon a new and interesting approach to an old field of study. It is the author's purpose in this book to attempt to portray, chiefly from the *Jesuit Relations*, the reaction of the Jesuit missionary to the savages of New France. The book treats of most aspects of aboriginal life, such as the social life of the Indian, his political institutions, his philosophy and his physical makeup. All of these phases of Indian life are studied from the position of the missionary's interpretation of what was observed. After discussing these subjects, the author devotes a quite brief and final chapter to the subject of "the savage in France," in which we are shown something of the effect of information about the Indian of New France on the philosophers and popular writers of the day.

From the viewpoint of purely factual historical research, the author presents nothing new and probably did not wish to do so. If we assume that the author's purpose was to portray the reaction of the Jesuit missionary to Indian life, we must consider that the writer has done a fine job of selecting material to show what the Jesuit thought of what he observed. If, however, we wish to hold that the author is interpreting the Jesuit missionary's reaction to us, it may be said that the book is not too successful. Particularly in chapters nine and ten does this appear.

In spite of the above criticism, this is an interesting book and one which opens an intriguing field. It is quite difficult to apply canons of criticism to the abstract concepts which are handled here. The missionary was necessarily the child of his own background. Hence, his reaction to the native institutions which he saw, were influenced by the life which the missionary knew in old France, as well as by the supernatural purpose which explained the missionary's presence. Native philosophy, governmental institutions and the like so quickly changed after the coming of the white man that any interpretation of what the Indian really thought, or what his tribal customs actually meant, is difficult to determine.

This is an interesting book for those who enjoy anything about New France. It is a careful piece of work in which the author strives to work almost exclusively from the correct sources. This reviewer would have enjoyed a more full development of the last chapter.

Joseph P. Donnelly.

Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. II., edited by W. F. Craven and J. L. Gate. Univ. of Chicago. pp. xii, 897. \$6.00.

This book is the second in a series of seven volumes tracing the part played by the Army Air Forces in World War II. It deals with the action against Germany and Italy and covers the period from August of 1942 to December of 1943. It shows how the war in the Pacific forces a change in the master plan for the offensive in Europe and that for some time the Japanese war received top priority on materials.

The greater part of the volume traces the success of the Air Forces in the European and North African campaigns after the Japanese advance in the Pacific had been checked. Through the use of captured German and Italian records, it throws a new light on the actual combat figures and a complete appendix lists, in chronological order, the bomber missions flown by the Eighth Air Force. The volume is well footnoted and a complete set of notes for each chapter is found at the close of the volume. The book is highly recommended for a student of the history of the Airplane in World War II.

Gene Kropf.

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